and the pick of the British Army to a muddy grave-yard, is a story which must be told in detail later on. But when it was a question of reconsidering Chantilly tactics, Nivelle was only too ready. He had to justify the change in command. How was that to be done?

To be fair to him, he had some new ideas which were successfully exploited by his successors and opponents at a later stage in the War.

New ideas not carried out

But he himself failed to put them into execution through causes for which he was not exclusively responsible. The result was that the slaughter was continued by the same butting and bumping methods as those adopted by his predecessor. The site of Aceldama alone was changed. The field of blood was removed from the Somme Plateau to that of the Chemin des Dames.

That was in effect the only gain achieved by the substitution of Nivelle for Joffre.

How came the Allies to slither back into the old sanguinary military ruts ? I propose to tell the story without reference to its effect on the reputation of any soldier or statesman who played a part in its construction—whether it be my own or others. It is time the whole of the facts about both the Nivelle and the Passchendaele offensives should be stated without variation or varnish to suit anybody.

The " way round " was for the moment effectively barred. I have already explained why a

Balkan operation was, for this year, out of the *No alternative* question. The way through Italy was not *Front* available. The timidity of Gadorna and the flabbiness of the Italian Ministry had enabled the French to slam that gate with the greatest ease. There was another circumstance which led